Providing effective and scalable real-time security to Internet of Things devices can be a challenging task given the limited computational capacity of portable devices and a significant volume of network traffic. Multi-Agent Systems have proven to be a valuable tool in the areas of cyber security, distributed networks and legacy systems because of their scalable and flexible architecture. In this paper, we present a novel implementation of a Multi-Agent System for use within, or to support, Internet of Things networks through the distributed processing of security events to offload the computational cost of processing data from Internet of Things devices. In particular, domain experts can add new agents to existing systems which can automatically work with preexisting agents without manual reconfiguration. The scalability of this deployment model makes it suitable for a broad range of environments including dynamic and large-area networks.
INTRODUCTION
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) [Woolridge 2011 ] can be distinguished from traditional software by its distributed and autonomous deployment model. Traditional approaches to cyber security usually process network traffic through a single Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [Mukherjee et al. 1994] . With the increasing amount of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. traffic flowing through networks, IDSs require expensive and highperformance hardware to manage the computationally expensive task of processing data in real time. With the limited capacity of most Internet of Things (IoT) [Roman et al. 2013] devices, a more scalable approach is required to deliver the necessary level of security to devices lacking the capacity to process or store significant amounts of data. In this paper, a MAS is proposed to offload the computational cost from IoT devices to specialised agents located on different networks to perform an in-depth, intelligent and automatic analysis of the network traffic flowing to IoT devices. Agents perform network forensics [Garfinkel 2010 ] automatically using previously collected knowledge to search for new evidence in the areas that it is most likely to be found.
Network forensics is an established process most commonly performed manually by trained practitioners who analyse the cause and spread of an attack after the fact. In this paper, network forensics is automated and adapted for use within the IoT environment where domain-specific factors such as having a multitude of independently created devices, a variety of different protocols and devices spread across a large network are commonplace. By giving agents the tools to perform network forensics autonomously, we are able to collect and analyse data faster, avoiding problems such as data degradation and concerns about leaking private information. By giving agents the ability to follow one line of investigation over another, when previously collected evidence supports it, agents will avoid performing unnecessary and unimportant data collection thereby making the system more efficient than traditional brute force attempts to analyse the entire contents of a given network. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains an overview of related works in the IoT and MAS fields. Section 3 contains an analysis of current security technologies and issues to consider within the IoT environment. Section 4 provides an explanation of the proposed Multi-Agent architecture. Section 5 describes the implemented simulator using concepts described throughout this paper. Finally, Section 6 suggests possible next steps towards developing more scalable Multi-Agent IoT security technologies.
RELATED RESEARCH
Shakarian et al. [Shakarian et al. 2015 ] described a cyber attribution system that takes into consideration different data sources and uses a MAS to reason about the origin of an attack through the use of agent reasoning. The system uses information gathered about the attack as well as information gathered from a wide range of military sources to reason in-depth about the attribution of an attack. Agents could both reason about facts and make presumptions by considering the trustworthiness of each source. Facts would, by default, be trusted more, while presumptions would be relied on less based on the trustworthiness of the source of information that the presumption was gathered from. The use of external information provided an effective way to gain extra contextual information for detected attacks but was heavily reliant on previously collected and catalogued information from military sources.
Shanmugasundaram et al. [Shanmugasundaram et al. 2003 ] developed a distributed forensics system using a hierarchical approach with multiple configurable sensors that were distributed throughout a network. The system uses a variety of sensors and servers to collect and aggregate the information and attempt to derive the nature of the security event from the collected data. The attack type is determined based on which pieces of evidence are and are not found during the search. In the complex and changing cyber security environment, this approach is desirable as the lack of information does not necessarily conclude no attack is taking place.
Oriwoh et al. [Oriwoh et al. 2013 ] describes a forensics response model tailored for IoT environments taking into consideration the increased scope and complexity faced by forensic analysts. Performing manual forensics by trained practitioners can be a timeconsuming task in an IoT environment where great distances can physically separate the devices, and the number of devices can be many. The architecture proposed in this paper uses evidence to inform future searches has been modelled using a MAS to automate the forensic process in IoT environments. This model is beneficial over the traditional IDS approach of analysing security events where data is analysed according to known signatures or anomaly analysis without the forensic feedback loop to help inform future analysis of relevant data.
Suo et al. [Suo et al. 2012] highlighted the security concerns at each of the four conceptual layers for IoT devices (perceptual, network, support and application). At each layer there exists different security technologies for detecting and blocking particular attacks. However, this does not attempt to understand the attacker or consider the implications of suspicious but not necessarily malicious activity. A more complete approach to security is needed wherein the behaviour of the attacker is studied to understand how they are attempting to penetrate the network and to collect relevant data from any affected nodes.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Scalability. Traditional security models for protecting IoT networks have often included several nodes that collect and then deliver data to an IDS for processing. This hierarchical model where data is sent back to a central location is inefficient in operation and can result in performance bottlenecks when too much data is delivered to the IDS for processing. Furthermore, it is not scalable since the security of the network is dependent on the capacity of the IDS, introducing more IoT devices onto the network would result in decreased security if the IDS is not also scaled. This limited model, typically found in a single organisation implementing a network of IoT devices, does not scale to greater levels, for example in a cooperative environment with multiple institutions. Instead, a distributed multi-agent architecture is proposed to support IoT devices by offloading the computational cost from the IoT network to the network of security-focused agents as will be discussed in Section 4).
Data Sharing. There has been a historical reluctance in sharing network data, especially security data, because of the risk that information (e.g., personal or organisational data) could be unintentionally leaked to competitors. While merging networks together has proven to be a useful measure to take (e.g., in the case of the supply chain network), security has typically been performed independently on each network with minimal data sharing taking place. In the case of multiple interacting IoT networks the benefits of sharing data are even greater where performing computational processing is expensive and sharing conclusions about security events could considerably reduce the overall amount of work that must be done. Devices of similar type and function are more likely to experience similar attacks and so would benefit from being able to communicate that they are under attack, even without disclosing any specific data [Nicholson et al. 2012] .
Network Forensics. Network forensics [Garfinkel 2010 ] is the process of collection and analysis of digital evidence. This process is most commonly performed manually by trained practitioners after a successful cyber breach has occurred to understand the event more clearly. Forensic practitioners will typically begin with a more general analysis of the network and then narrow down their search based on the already collected digital evidence. In this way, network forensics is an iterative process of search and discovery using what is already known to find more evidence. Network forensics is not a part of the conventional intrusion detection toolkit and is instead a separate component to signature and anomaly detection. However, the process itself is efficient [Hoelz et al. 2009 ] in the way evidence is searched for only in locations that the analyst would expect evidence to be found in, and is a valuable component of the proposed architecture. The forensic process can be automated for use within a MAS owing to the repetitive nature of activities that must be undertaken. Data must be collected and then analysed to find other data collection tasks that are more likely to return relevant data given the previous task. By using a MAS, with several agents capable of performing individual data collection tasks, agents can be organised to gather relevant information iteratively. Domain Expert. Security achieved through the use of a signature detection [Scarfone and Mell 2007] requires that a domain expert create the rules for detecting the known attacks. Corporate software will often use a variety of proprietary protocols that are not well supported by open source IDSs such as Snort [Snort 2016 ] and Bro [Paxson 1999] , two popular open source systems. With the increasing interest in IoT devices, the number of protocols has also steadily increased, but widespread support is still lacking. A scalable approach wherein the developers of these protocols can easily and independently define malicious activities is required as a component that can be easily included in the running network. Given the example of network layer security [Jing et al. 2014] , which typically uses sources of threat intelligence [Randall 2016 ] (e.g., lists of known malicious IP addresses or a whitelist of allow locations) to perform security, we believe it is desirable to have multiple lightweight agents to monitor these sources and take actions, but also make it easy for developers to create agents for protocol-specific monitors.
MULTI-AGENT ARCHITECTURE FOR INTERNET OF THINGS
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed agent model for the decentralised collection and analysis of cyber security data. Our system is composed of a number of agents (G = {д 1 , ..., д i }), each one capable of performing one data collection and analysis task for a particular service of technology. This information is formalised by a set of features F representing different attributes or characteristics of a given activity; e.g., the IP address of a given connection, Virtual Private Network (VPN) usage, etc. Each feature (f ∈ F ) has a domain (D f ) containing all its possible values. The data collection task entails the agent interacting with a data source which may be a host device, server, log file or any other component from which information can be gathered. These could be located either locally on the network that the agent is protecting or remotely on an internet-connected server. Each data collection task is designed only to collect one piece of information so that many lightweight agents collecting different pieces of data can be created for each source. As the network expands with new technologies, additional agents can be added to interact with them. A data analysis task will classify the data that was collected to determine, based on the agent's local signature or anomaly detection database, whether collected data is malicious or innocuous. These two components of data collection and analysis form the basis of the agent's abilities to be able to sense the environment, collect relevant information and analyse it without the need for administrator oversight. Consider the following two definitions:
Definition 4.1. A data collection action is defined as a tuple ⟨C, e⟩ in which:
• C is the action conditions; i.e., a set of pairs (f , v) where feature f ∈ F and value v ∈ D f ; • e ∈ F is the action effect; i.e., a feature whose value will be determined by the action.
Definition 4.2. Given a set of pairs (f , v) representing the available information about a suspicious activity, a data analysis action is defined as a function returning a value between [0, 1] representing the probability of the suspicious activity being malicious.
Each of the agents will also have a set of constraints placed on them which must be satisfied before the agent can perform its data collection and analysis tasks. Each constraint will be a piece of data about the security environment, for example, an agent monitoring a VPN service may hold the constraint that it requires a remote IP address before it may perform its data collection task. The data for this constraint will come from data that another agent collects during its data collection task. For this system, the constraints will be called the conditions and the data gathered during the data collection process the effect. Each agent should only perform one data collection task and should produce one effect, however, it may have several conditions depending upon the actual data collection task it is designed to perform. Definition 4.3. Given a set I formed by pairs (f , v) representing the available information about a suspicious activity, and a data collection action ⟨C, e⟩ we define that action conditions are satisfied iff for all (f , v) ∈ C, (f , v) ∈ I .
The concept of an extended data collection task is introduced to describe the process of several agents performing their data collection and analysis tasks together for investigating potential security event. Since conditions are derived from the effects, when a new effect is gathered during the data collection process, it may satisfy the condition of another agent, resulting in additional agents being able to perform their data collection and analysis tasks. In addition to participating in extended data collection tasks, each agent will be responsible for the continual monitoring of a data source. If during this continual process some data is flagged as being potentially malicious, the extended data collection process will begin with an agent communicating its effect to any agents who have the effect set as a condition. Figure 1 illustrates this concept using four agents (A1-A4) with the first agent (A1) communicating its effect discovered during that task to the next agent that can process it (A2). The result of the data analysis process is a judgement about the collected or monitored data of either malicious or innocuous, within the system, this is called the local decision.
A communication model allows for the transfer of information between agents, the main use of which involves the sending of a report between agents which is a grouping of the agent's ID, effect and the local decision about the maliciousness of the data. The report is generated and then sent to the next agent whose conditions have been satisfied by the effects already known, each agent generates their report and aggregates it with the reports that it receives. The transfer of the aggregated set of reports facilitates the build-up of information within the agent network and is called the extended data collection task. Figure 1 illustrates this with data collected from an information source during stages 1 and 3 by two separate agents, the data collected forms the agent's effect and is broadcast out to other agents at stage 2. Agents whose conditions are satisfied by the effect (Agent-2) respond by requesting the full report, following this, the report is sent that the requesting agent. Definition 1. A local report defined as a tuple ⟨д, (f , v), p⟩ where:
• д ∈ G is the agent's identity;
• (f , v) is a pair feature value corresponding to the output of the data collection action performed by agent д; • p ∈ [0, 1] is the agent's analysis of the suspicious activity; i.e., the probability of the suspicious activity being malicious.
At some point during the extended data collection process, there will be no more agents that can participate as their conditions have not been satisfied. At this stage, the aggregated set of reports will contain several IDs, effects and local decisions about the maliciousness of the effect data. Using this set of local decisions, the last agent to receive the set will calculate the final global decision for the participating agents. The final global decision is calculated using a voting system [Woolridge 2011 ] which will use the local decisions (collectively named the global report) to come to a final decision about the security event as a whole. If the global decision returned is "malicious" then the agents will be justified in acting against the detected attacker knowing that other agents have also detected an attack. The communications protocol is also used to send the results of the global decision to each of the participating agents informing them after it has been made. Definition 2. A global report R is defined as a set of local reports {⟨д 1 , (f 1 , v 1 ), p 1 ⟩, ..., ⟨д n , (f n , v n ), p n ⟩} containing the information collected by different agents participating in a same extended data collection process.
Definition 3. Given a global report G representing the local decisions made by the agents participating in an extend data collection process, the global decision is a function returning a value between [0, 1] representing the collective judgement about the maliciousness of the investigated activity.
This section has outlined the basic architecture for the propagation of information through the agent network. Each agent has a condition that must be satisfied before it may take part in the extended data collection and produces and effect based on its findings. This architecture is desirable for many reasons: Data Sharing. Within this architecture the decision made by each agent is the important variable that must be shared. Within environments with multiple systems interacting with each other, it is as discussed previously, beneficial to share security data to gain a more holistic view of the network. However, businesses often have concerns about data being disclosed to competitors and so are reluctant to share security data. In the proposed architecture, the decisions can be sent from agent-to-agent without the actual information used to make that decision, making it a viable system for multiple systems (IoT networks belonging to different organisations) to interact and share conclusions about events without disclosing sensitive information. The approach of sharing higher level conclusions about events, for example, that a port scan occurred and it was found to be malicious, is a more secure approach than to share the actual network packet data which could contain sensitive information.
Network Forensics. This architecture was designed to make use of the forensic process to be more efficient in detecting cyber attacks. With the limited capacity of IoT devices, probing every available device for information is computationally expensive, so the alternative approach of using what is already known to inform where to look next is taken. Agents may only take part in the extended data collection task if all their conditions are first satisfied. If the information necessary for the agent's data collection and analysis task is missing or not yet known, they will not attempt to take part in the investigation until enough evidence has been accumulated to suggest that they are likely to find more evidence. Domain Expert. This system makes it easy for the domain expert or device creator to build new agents for the environment without needing to be aware of other existing agents. Each agent is viewed as an independent entity, with any information required for its analysis of the data to be included (or made aware of its location) upon its creation. The use of conditions and effects allows the agents to assimilate into the agent network by fitting into the extended data collection process when its conditions are satisfied.
Agent Discovery & Communication
To allow agents participating in an extended data collection to coordinate, this model includes an interaction protocol (depicted in Figure 2 ). The protocol is formed by five main phases: (i) request for participants; (ii) proposals from available participants; (iii) participant selection; (iv) inform summary; (v) inform result, described as follows.
Request for Participants.
Once an agent has performed its data collection and analysis tasks, the agent must add its local report to the global report and then send it to the next agent for further information collection. The communication module is used to facilitate this.
The first step of the interaction protocol is to request help from other agents that can participate in the data collection process. In particular, the set of feature-value pairs are extracted from the global report and then broadcast (by the initiating agent) to the other agents. Given a global report {⟨д 1 , (f 1 , v 1 ), p 1 ⟩, ..., ⟨д n , (f n , v n ), p n ⟩} a request for participation is formalised as a set { (f 1 , v 1 ) , ..., (f n , v n )} containing the available information about currently known broadcast out to all agents.
Proposals from Participants. Any agents whose data collection action is satisfied by the information contained can respond by indicating their availability to participate in the extended data collection task. Figure 2 illustrates this with Agent 2 broadcasting to other agents on the network. Participant Selection. It is possible that several agents respond to the initial request indicating that they can work with the available data. The initiator must decide which agent will be selected to continue with the data collection process. In particular, the initiator will send the whole global report to this selected agent.
Unlike in other MAS solutions, the proposed model does not include a central repository of agents which can be queried to find the most suitable agent for a given task. This improves scalability but requires a system to allow agents to find each other. The agents will maintain a local database of agents that they have previously worked with. Deciding which agent should be selected as the preferred agent will affect the performance of the system as a whole. If the most optimal agent is selected for the task most of the time, the search process will improve as less time is spent performing data collection by unreliable agents. There are several ways in which the preferred agent can be identified based on what is important in a given situation. If accuracy is important for the current event the agents may select the agent that most often votes correctly, this will result in a more accurate search. If time is a major factor during an event the agent may choose the fastest performing agent to collect information quickly, this will produce a result faster than the previous but could potentially lead to a less certain decision. While an analysis of factors such as these could be done to determine the optimal preferred agent selection algorithm, events within the security environment can often be unpredictable and allowing the agents to choose the preferred agent at run time could produce a more adaptable solution.
Inform Summary. The agent selected from the previous stage (termed the child agent) will send back a summary to the previous agent (termed the parent agent) containing information about the decision it made during its own data collection task, this is done so the parent agent may evaluate the performance of the child agent by comparing its decision to the groups. This process can be viewed in Figure 2 with Agent 3 (the child) that sends back a summary to Agent 2 (the parent). The parent agent will log this summary for use in selecting the child agent in future extended data collection tasks. The parameters sent in the summary will include the agent's local decision about the maliciousness of the event in addition to performance variables such as the time taken to perform the collection task, the importance of the data collected and the computational cost of performing the collection.
Inform Result. Once a final decision has been reached, the final decision will be sent to all of the participating agents, this can then be used by the agents to review its method for selecting the preferred agent (e.g., the preference can be increased for those agents with local decisions in-line with the final decision).
Agent Coalitions
Coalitions are used within the system to increase the speed at which agents can be consulted during the extended data collection task as well as to compensate for a large number of agents outvoting a smaller number when it is not desirable to do so. The most basic algorithm for use within this architecture is to consider the amount of votes cast by all of the participating agents for either malicious or innocuous and make a decision about the event as a whole based upon the total. This method of tallying votes to decide the overall decision is useful for detecting less advanced attacks with multiple agents that can detect the attack from different areas on the network. However, in the case of advanced stealthy attacks, because a large number of unreliable agents may outvote a smaller number of reliable agents it becomes less accurate. This most often occurs while performing network-layer threat intelligence gathering from multiple sources. If an IP address is well known for being malicious and multiple threat intelligence vendors have logged it as being so, then detection of the IP address given many votes for it being malicious accurately detects the user. However, if the IP address is unknown to many threat intelligence vendors and there are a large number of agents monitoring a variety of vendors, there will be an overwhelming number of innocuous votes which would outvote a smaller number of agents that have correctly identified the attack in some other area of the network. Definition 4. A Coalition is a set of similar agents whose participation in the extended data collection task is organised by one member agent:
• R is a coalition record held by an agent;
• r ∈ R is an agent's identity from G stored within the records • Agents (д1 and д2) may only form a coalition together when both the condition types C д1 = C д2 and the effect type E д 1 = E д 2 are the same.
Coalitions are used in this instance to balance the weight of votes cast by a large number of similar agents so they do not dilute the votes of a smaller group. Where there are many similar agents that do not detect the presence of an attack, without coalitions, they may outvote a smaller minority of agents that do, coalitions corrects this problem. Only the coalition's representative will respond to the extended data collection task when its conditions are satisfied. Following this, it will communicate the global report containing the accumulated effects to each member of the coalition and receive their individual decisions. This process is viewed as a separate 1-stage extended data collection task performed locally within the coalition. The representative collects the votes and then a single decision for the group is decided based upon the chosen aggregation algorithm, the simplest of which is to take the highest number of votes in either direction of malicious or innocuous. The representative then delivers this final group decision as one vote.
Coalitions are locally formed when agents of the same type and function become aware of each other, for example, if several agents on a network all have the same conditions and possible effects, they are functionally the same and so will form a coalition. This often occurs with agents responsible for monitoring threat intelligence sources, often multiple sources will exist for the same type of information (e.g., file hashes) and each will have a dedicated agent, but they all have the same conditions and same possible effects.
The algorithm used within the coalition to aggregate the decisions will be chosen based upon a number of factors, for example, the importance of the data source; if the threat intelligence source used by the agent is a reliable indicator of compromise, then only one vote for malicious may be required. However, for less reliable sources, a majority vote may be required. The selection of this algorithm may be automated to an extent based on the consistency of group decisions, for example, if all agents tend to vote in a similar way, then the sources are likely more reliable than if the agents vote inconsistently.
SIMULATOR
A simulator was developed to explore the viability of the use of conditions and effects in the IoT environment. Currently three types of agents are included: the first is initialised from functionality adapted from the Bro IDS [Paxson 1999 ] representing the detection capabilities that it can perform; the second type are agents manually created using the agent-builder feature within the simulator allowing the creation of new agents for specific jobs; finally, the third type monitor sources of threat intelligence [Randall 2016 ] found online. Agents may form coalition [Kraus 1997 ] of similar agents that all share the same condition type and effect types. An example of this is an agent which is capable of performing a reputation lookup against IP addresses for a particular source online. There may be several agents of this type which can perform a reputation lookups for different sources, but the functionality (as well as the conditions and the effect types) are the same, and so are grouped together in a coalition.
Deployment Models
The architecture described so far has been framed as a distributed system that performs data collection and analysis over a network. The system can be deployed in two ways, the first being within the actual IoT devices if the capacity to support these agents is great enough. Having one or more agents operating on each device could be a viable distribution method if the devices have the capacity to support the processing required by each, which is far less taxing than having an entire IDS performing brute-force analysis from a single device. However, the agents may also be deployed in a supporting role by introducing more agents into the network. The agents described this far have all had a function to perform, e.g., an agent which can perform a geographical lookup against an IP address. However, this is a taxing function which may not be able to be supported on IoT devices. By including lightweight agents that perform no real processing, but rather, just aggregate data for use within the extended data collection task can be used as a way to retrieve the information from IoT devices and send it to remote agents located on more suitable hardware for analysis.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have discussed the use of a multi-agent security architecture for use within IoT networks. The distributed nature of IoT makes performing security more challenging as the devices do not have the benefit of a centralised IDS to monitor all connections. We will continue to develop the architecture with a focus on developing distributed algorithms for use within it. Particular emphasis will be placed on the scalability concerns of having domain experts create the knowledge of what is and what is not malicious. We believe that use of misuse detection and behaviour analysis in place of manually created rules will be a better alternative for the IoT environment due to the increased chance of working with proprietary protocols which will often result in a knowledge gap and lack of support from traditional systems. Future work will be focused on the development of efficient and accurate algorithms for the detection of security events within multi-agent environments and complex networks.
